Abstract. This paper examines Franciscan theories of property rights in the second and third decades of the fourteenth century. The writings of Bonagratia of Bergamo and Michael of Cesena are studied in particular because they were active in both decades, where different concerns might have shaped how they conceived of their poverty, and thus how property ownership worked. It is shown where and how much their description of what constitutes Franciscan poverty did change, despite the fact that the texts of both decades relied on the same papal declarations on Franciscan poverty, notably Exiit qui seminat (VI 5.12.3). In addition, an effort has been made to illuminate how deeply Roman law ideas about property rights shaped the writings of all sides of the debates.
One of the most neglected phases of the Franciscan poverty controversy is the decade and a half before the emergence of the (broadly speaking) Michaelist position on Franciscan and evangelical poverty in the 1320s.
1 This is surprising, if only because many momentous changes that occurred in the second and third decades of the fourteenth century had a direct bearing on how Franciscan poverty Besides Michael of Cesena, the most noteworthy Michaelists were Bonagratia of Bergamo (d. 1340), Francis of Marchia (ca. 1285/90-ca. 1345), and William of Ockham (ca. 1287-1347). With few exceptions, it used to be the case that everyone but Ockham languished in relative obscurity, but it is increasingly untrue today. 5 The historiography of the Community has not fared so well, unfortunately. The problem is compounded by the imprecision with which earlier studies deployed the term 'Community.' The basic problem is that the word suggests a homogenous group, united in its opposition to an equally monolithic group of dissident 'Spiritual' Franciscans, which is itself no less slippery a term. Even refinements such as the subdivision into 'moderate' and 'relaxed' wings of the Community paints too united a picture. 6 It is, in fact, a complicated story; and since this is not the place to delve into this issue, let me clarify the pragmatic way the term is used here. 7 As the texts under consideration repeatedly use the phrases pro ordinis parte and in nomine ordinis, there is reason to associate the opinions expressed in these texts with the leadership of the order rather than all non-"Spiritual" Franciscans, or even some nebulous subset of the order in general. Thus, instead of speaking of the Community in the pages that follow, I have instead opted to speak of the leadership of the order, with the understanding that they believed they were speaking on behalf of the order much like the relaxaciones described by the likes of Angelo Clareno and Ubertino of Casale were meant to refer to many, but not all, Franciscans. 8 What is important from the perspective of continuity is that both Michael's and Bonagratia's names are associated with attempts to suppress dissident opinions in the second decade of the fourteenth century only to be a source of dissident opinions themselves over the next two decades. 9 The immediate question that comes to mind is whether the Michaelist theory of property rights differed from the views of the leadership of the order in the previous decade. Certainly no Michaelist ever suggested this; and, in fact, they continued to rely on the same authorities as before, notably Exiit. Yet much had changed. Ubertino's sustained criticisms of the order's so-called relaxations and violations of poverty notwithstanding, Pope John XXII's request for debate as well as his own declarations introduced new terminology and conceptual precision to the controversy. The order's constitutions of 1325 and 1331 bear manifest witness to the altered circumstances. There was, clearly, plenty of room for change. But did they, or can it simply be seen as a shift of emphasis with the underlying theory unchanged?
One shift of emphasis is well known, and is best mentioned at the outset: the role of usus pauper in the practice of Franciscan poverty. For the Michaelist-John controversy the question of usus pauper was moot, while it stood at the centre of controversy during the pontificate of Clement V (r. 1305-1314). 10 The usus pauper controversy was a qualitative one; the question then was about kind of use was entailed by a Franciscan's vow of poverty. But what was understood throughout was that, whatever kind of use was appropriate to or required by the Franciscan status, it was a use free of property rights, both individually and in common.
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Even so, the texts as we have them show that the Franciscan position on poverty had developed a much more elaborate theory of the nature of property rights than a simple division of use and ownership.
property rights during the 'great debate' (1309-1311)
The pontificate of Clement V was a period of internal controversy for the Franciscan order. 12 There was disagreement about a number of topics, especially on the interrelated matters of the teachings of Peter of John Olivi, who had passed away a decade earlier (1298), and on how the Franciscan vow of poverty was to be interpreted and observed. 13 In 1309, Clement V canvassed Franciscan opinions about four related questions: (1) whether they knew of any heretics in the order; (2) whether the Rule was being observed in the order; (3) whether there were any errors in the books of Olivi; and (4) about the persecutions they (and others) were experiencing.
14 As Eva Wittneben noted, the very phrasing of the questions suggests Clement was, initially at least, favourably disposed to the plight of the spirituals. 
Infrascripta dant (1311)
One of the responses was made by the former Minister-General, Raymond Geoffroi, who, rather cautiously, came out in favour of the Spirituals. This provoked a response from Bonagratia and Raymond Fronsac, known as the Infrascripta dant, which dates from about 1311, and which they apparently wrote before they saw any of Ubertino's responses. 16 In this early document, when it deals with property rights, the focus is on examples of alleged violations of Franciscan poverty, and thus on how and what things are being used; the underlying assumption is, naturally, that the Franciscans are not property-holders in any sense, except where-absit!-they act as if they were. Thus, there is very little in the way of discussion about ius, dominium, or proprietas.
There is mention of how the Church 'appropriated to itself the ownership and possession of all buildings and things that the Friars Minor use, with simple use left to them as, so to speak, pilgrims . . . thus, since they have simple use of fact, they cannot destroy them because they cannot worsen or ruin an item of a property-holder. ' 17 Here the central idea can be understood in Roman law terms in the following way: simple use, even a use of right, falls short of a right of disposal (abusus), which tends only to be available to the individual who has dominium.
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As for the alms given by pious donors, Bonagratia and Raymond explained that, unless the donor recalled the alms, it is assumed that their will remains set on the friars using the alms. 19 One can see quite clearly here the kernel of the idea that friars use things by special licence as well as the idea that lordship of consumables can remain separate right to the point of their total consumption. (Unless specified otherwise, I shall use "lordship" to refer to proprietary lordship.)
Certain other features of lordship seem to remain with the order, however, albeit at arm's length. Important for Bonagratia and Raymond were the provisions 16 of Exultantes in Domino, a bull issued by Martin IV in 1283. 20 This bull was important for Bonagratia and Raymond in two major respects. First, it insisted that the friars 'can fight in court for no temporal thing. ' 21 The inability to take legal action in court was to be a mainstay of the interpretation of the friars as fundamentally 'rightless. ' Yet, the second important provision of the bull significantly mitigated the first, for it gave the friars control over the nomination and removal of personas speciales, who were to deal with the goods donated to the friars for their use. In fact, these agents of the friars had a 'full, general, and free power' to act in-and outside of court to protect not only the alms given for use by the friars, but even to protect the friars' 'immunities, liberties, rights, privileges, and concessions.'
22
Although modern historiography has not been kind regarding the provisions of this bull, 23 Bonagratia and Raymond accepted the provisions of Exultantes, and thought it wrong to criticize them as they had been established by papal authority. 24 The key must have been that the friars did not exercise these powers directly, which suggest by their very denial that Bonagratia and Raymond considered them features of property ownership. In subsequent writings, they would expand on this point.
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Infrascripta dant discusses use at far greater length, mainly in an effort to deny the relevance of usus pauper, which was a concept they thought added little to Franciscan poverty beyond an unacceptable level of obscurity. 26 Bonagratia and Raymond insisted that, rather than worry about this vague concept, the general constitutions of the order ensured use was restricted enough; 27 and the Rule itself demanded a 'beggarly' (vilis) use on many points, such as using cheap clothes and not riding animals. However, Bonagratia and Raymond claimed that such things were not 'of the substance of the Rule,' which means that the pope can dispense 20. BF, 3:501a-02a. This bull was reissued as an apostolic constitution in 1290 by Nicholas with them if he is so inclined. 28 However, this is not true for substantial elements (substantialia) of the Rule.
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Thus the key for Bonagratia and Raymond regarding use, was that it was limited by the Rule, Exiit, and the constitutions of the order. It was a simple use of fact, which did not allow them to diminish or wear down non-consumables. 30 The interaction of use and lordship is not discussed in any detail, presumably because the separability of the two had been assumed since Gregory IX promulgated Quo elongati in 1230. 31 Instead, what Bonagratia and Raymond spoke about was the manner in which the Franciscans were to use things. In a phrase hearkening back to the Rule, Bonagratia and Raymond explained that one was 'to use things as not one's own.' 32 A Franciscan therefore had to avoid the desire to use things; this was more important than the nature of the thing used. 33 It was a question of will: the friars were not to have any possessive or dominative desire when they used the things they had vowed not to own. This position had a long pedigree. 34 The Rule itself enjoined the friars to live as strangers and guests, 35 and even as far back as Benedict a monk was to give up control over his own will. 36 The idea that Franciscans had to avoid using things with possessive or dominative intentions 28 3 ) 27, notes that for St Benedict, 'The monastic life began with the intention to renounce self-will and to place oneself under the will of a superior. ' St Basil held a similar position: 'The novice was to renounce his own will and obey the superior in everything, in spirit as well as in act, on the model of Christ, who was "obedient unto death"' (ibid. 9-10). 9* remained a feature of Franciscan writings on poverty in the thirteenth century.
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But it was a commonplace of Roman law, too, as Bonagratia, a princeps litigiorum in Angelo Clareno's characterization, would have been well aware. 38 The Digest, for example, explained that 'we acquire possession by body and soul, not by soul alone, nor by body alone. ' 39 
Two Responses to Ubertino's Rotulus
We have two similar responses to Ubertino's Rotulus. The first, Religiosi viri, was probably composed in time for the opening of the Council of Vienne (October 1311), while the second, Sapientia aedificavit, was likely composed in the spring of 1312 or thereabouts. 40 Due to their similarities, it is best to consider them together. What set Franciscans apart from other religious was their commitment to the highest poverty, which was fundamentally a poverty of expropriation made concrete through the abdication of all ownership, both individually and in common. 41 Thus, in the case of donations, the ius and dominium remains always with the Simply put, rights of seeking or demanding do not belong to the friars. 44 One might be forgiven for thinking it hard to consider the lack of an actio a particularly compelling feature of penuriousness when the friars have, by Exultantes, the power to appoint and remove from office those who have control over the pursestrings; the leaders of the community, however, did not find the arrangement strange. The provincial ministers had the authority to nominate the procurators, but the procurators belong to the pope and the Church, as Martin IV's bull legislated. Any action they undertake is done in the name of the Church. 45 Much the same can be said about Ubertino's complaint that these agents of the friars-depositarii, bursarii-who are led as if they were their own personal errand boys, and who were to spend money on books at the whim of the friar. Often, while these youths carry the strongbox with the money in it, the friar himself will carry the key. Such individuals appear to be more like lords of not only the money, but of the spending of servants. 46 Yet, argued the leaders of the community, appearances aren't everything. No ius or dominium is acquired by carrying a key, for the lordship of the money remains with the donor. 47 The rationale once again lies in a consideration of the intentions of the donor and the friar. their part, the friars themselves do not intend to take possession of things like money. They do not use things in general as propria. 49 Thus, it is not inappropriate for a friar to indicate his needs to the nuncius so that they can be taken care of. The friar knows he has absolutely no ius, and he does not mean to suggest that he is a lord of the money simply because he revealed the details of his needs. 50 What, then, are the qualities of owning property? Three points are made about the friars' relationship with money:
(i) First, no actio or ius belongs to the friars against anyone for that money, which the depositor or nuncio of the lord has (the same holds for similar things);
(ii) Second, the lord can reclaim the item when he wishes; and (iii) Third, the friars are not permitted to conserve the item except for urgent or imminent future necessities.
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Far different was the way an entrant could dispose of his goods prior to entering the order. Although Ubertino was unimpressed with this practice, Religiosi viri insisted, citing the Rule for support, that the entrant could dispose of his goods as he wished, even if that meant expending it on the needs of his brothers-to-be. In a very clear allusion to Justinian's Codex, they explained that that is the kind of power people generally have over their own things: 'the laws say that everyone has a free faculty of disposing of his own things, and that each person ought to be the legitimate master and lord over his own things. ' 52 This arrangement was in fact already enshrined in the general constitutions of Padua (1310), but it is just possible that Ubertino's complaints led to an omission of the clause that allowed Regarding the second point, Religiosi viri also suggests that 'the lordship of the money always remains in the power of the donor until it is converted to the needs of the friars. ' 54 Although the passage would seem to suggest that there was an interval between the donation and the eventual use by the friars, according to (iii) we should perhaps infer that the time between conversion and use was (to be) instantaneous; or, in the case of non-consumables, even while the friar was using the thing. That is, the lord could recall his donation at any point up to when the friar was actually using the thing. Yet there remains an inconsistency if the donated money were spent on non-consumable items such as books or clothing. Is the idea supposed to be that once the money has been spent on a book, and thus 'consumed,' that it was too late for the lord to recall his donation? One possible answer is to suggest that lordship transferred at that point to the Church, to which 'pertains the right, ownership, and lordship, ' 55 but this is never specified outright. Neither Religiosi viri nor Sapientia aedificavit give a satisfactory answer to the question.
Property Rights in the Declaration on Usus pauper
One of the most mature works the leaders of the community ever produced is the Circa materiam, which was likely written around the turn of 1310. 56 One of the great virtues of Circa materiam is its brevity, all the more precious for how rare it is in the mendicant poverty controversy. Even so, the text presents a strong case for rejecting the inclusion of usus pauper in the vow of poverty. Yet in doing so, it also presents a clear picture of the propertyless poverty that is included in the Rule.
Circa materiam analyzes two kinds of poverty: penury and strictness in use, and the familiar abdication of lordship and ownership of things; only the second type of poverty falls under the vow. 59 That is, the friars have no lordship or ownership, nor any right, having instead simple use of fact. The two practical outcomes are that friars do not have any ability to reclaim things in court, 60 and that the friars must use things like they belonged to someone else. The authors made the point that this kind of use must be considered a positive, extrinsic act: one is not merely denying his will, but is actively not-wishing for proprium, both individually and in common, that is, to render himself unable to have things in this way. 61 The authors then concluded that this 'interior act of poverty' is more meritorious than the mere outward act of poor use, which may strike some as an unfortunate line of argument since John XXII would make a similar claim-he spoke of the interior disposition-in his own bulls. 62 By avoiding this desire to use (ipsa utendi libido), one could have a use of simple fact at the table of a rich man without worrying about whether the food ought to be considered poor or rich. 
A Summary of the Community's Position
Property ownership as it is described in these four texts, then, can be represented tentatively in the following way (Fig. 1) . 64 Although the feature list regarding property rights has been a carefully qualified catalogue of what Franciscans do not, or must not, have, it is, by the same token, a list of the characteristics of property ownership. Just as dominium is the underlying or "absolute" right of ownership in Roman law, 65 the fundamental characteristic in the leadership's view seems to be the 'free faculty of disposing'; conceptually, everything else seems to fit easily underneath. Below this level, we can divide things into three broad categories: administrative powers, legal powers, and types of use. In normal situations, a friar would have only the limited ability of simple use. (The Michaelists would employ facultas to describe this rightless ability, but the term is not used in this sense yet.) Other people, especially regular laypeople, might have a far greater range of actions available to them. Broadly speaking, they may manage something they own by giving it away, selling or exchanging it, or simply stockpiling and saving it for later. They may also control, in general, access to it, either directly or through a delegate. Franciscans, too, might exercise this form of control, which by itself, they insisted, was not a type of proprietary control. They defended this position by stressing the importance of intention in particular, but also by claiming the inability to take any legal action. Taken together, the texts defended the state of "propertylessness" in both the ethical and legal spheres. 66 After all, as Religiosi viri noted, the abandonment of one's will was no small sacrifice. 67 When a Franciscan happened to control access to the donations in a strongbox, he did not mean to control access, he just happened to have control. This disposition mapped perfectly onto the way a Franciscan was to use things in general. The final category of use received much more attention. Here the emphasis was on simple use, the only type of use a friar could exercise. They could not mis-use things, nor dispose of them in any way they wished. They had merely, as one text put it, use by licence. If the account of use seems rather simple so far, the Michaelists would paint a more complex picture in the next decade. changes in the general constitutions As we have seen, the leaders of the order relied on the general constitutions to make their case that Franciscan poverty was strict enough for the order.
68 Although this answer did not satisfy a critic like Ubertino, who saw violations of the constitutions at nearly every turn, and which were not strict enough anyway, the constitutions promulgated between 1310 and 1325 had to weather several momentous publications by popes Clement V and John XXII. Thus, they are important sources for looking at how the leadership of the order understood property rights. to an express prohibition against living in places where it was impossible to live without the need to stockpile grain and wine. 70 Many of the other additions simply expanded the list of prohibited excesses in Franciscan buildings, such as vaulted ceilings and glass windows. 71 The Parisian constitutions reaffirm the prohibition against litigating in court for recovering bodies for burial, but add that they should take care to avoid creating any scandal with respect to burials and testaments.
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In 1310, there is not much evidence of the heightened tensions between the Spirituals and the leaders of the order expressed in terms of Franciscan poverty. 73 We see, for instance, a further specification of the way in which bequests may be received. 74 In an effort to curb excesses and superfluity in the order, the Paduan statutes also include a strong prohibition against procuring, directly or indirectly, any licence from prelates of the order.
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The constitutions of Assisi 1 (1316) and Lyons (1325) present a very different picture.
76 Not only are there many additions and modifications, but even the order within the chapters is changed. At Assisi, we can see an attempt to ensure the outward manifestation of poverty was neither too lax nor too extreme. While earlier constitutions had simply repeated the clause from Narbonne that Franciscan clothing was to be cheap or beggarly (vilis) in both price and colour, CAssis. 1 went much further. The brothers had to observe a uniformity of dress 'decently' in terms of value, colour, and size: they had to avoid deformity, uniqueness, preciousness, and superfluity. More important than this, perhaps, was the point that 70 , especially as they relate to the internal Franciscan conflict. Following the practice in AF 17, I use a superscript "1" to distinguish these constitutions from an earlier collection of 1279. the worth(lessness) of the clothing was left to the judment of the prelates-a point that John would also make. 77 Similarly, the prohibition against receiving money was expanded as well with a reference to Nicholas III and Clement V, who had declared how the prohibition was to be understood. 78 Michael of Cesena also enters the picture at this point, for he issued a statutory letter (litterae statutoriae) to the individual provincial ministers sometime in August or September of 1316.
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Michael seemingly felt the need to go beyond the 'newly reformed and shortened (correptas) general constitutions' because he knew from experience that the brothers were generally (comuniter) prone to breaking or not observing a good many of the statutes. Thus, he thought it advisable to add a few points which were to be observed by all.
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All of his 'extra' points are concerned with the practice of poverty, and there are no real surprises because Michael did not really make any additional demands on the observance of the friars. 81 Michael, too, was worried about vilitas in attire: it was to be observed, without any curiositas in the stitching; but at the same time, there should not be any indecent length or breadth in the sizing. 82 Footgear was also to remain off-limits except 'for manifest necessity or evident infirmity. ' 83 Michael was perhaps stricter about money: it could not be received or deposited except 'for present or imminent future necessity' (pro necessitate presenti vel de proximo imminenti).
84 This was a phrase that had a venerable history in writings on Franciscan poverty, and can be seen as far back as the Constitutions of Narbonne. 85 Even necessary money needed to be converted within an acceptable time frame, or, said Michael, it will be taken away. 86 As for gardens, Michael, citing Exivi, accepted their existence, but confirmed the prohibition against selling what the friars grew (hortalitia). 87 In short, Michael's early work as Minister-General seems to have been devoted to attacking excesses on both sides, rather than have been focused solely on suppressing the Spirituals 88 -though we may wonder if the excesses were so evenly distributed.
The Constitutions of Lyons are perhaps the most interesting of them all. They date from 1325 and thus were composed after the dissemination of both versions of Ad conditorem canonum (1322-23), Cum inter nonnullos (1323), and Quia quorundam mentes (1324). At the same time, some of the earlier bulls of John were palatable to the leaders of the order, notably Quorundam exigit (1317), which dated from the period in which Michael of Cesena and John XXII were working in tandem to bring everyone under regular obedience. 89 Thus, it seems as though the leaders of the order thought it best to include what they could of John's in support of the basic position they were trying to promote. 90 Of course, John's later declarations were received with less acclaim, and it seems to have been the practice of the drafters of the Constitutions of Lyons to ignore John's bulls of the 1320s-perhaps as chapters of an as of yet unsettled debate-in in favour of Exiit and Exivi. Even so, the most noteworthy feature of these constitutions is that the third chapter, which deals with poverty in general ('De observantia paupertatis'), grew to be several times longer than previous incarnations of this chapter.
Thus the earlier prohibition against the friars receiving money, which had already been expanded by multiple references to Nicholas III and Clement V in the constitutions of 1316, now included several direct quotations (and explicit citations of the specific paragraphi of each), explaining in careful detail how one must understand the prohibition against receiving money.
91 As before, the limitations on the use of money continue to be based on the judgment of the leaders (sui prelati iudicio), and legitimate uses of money remain for writing or purchasing (required) books, clothes, dealing with illness, long and likely difficult journeys. 92 Yet another new stipulation, which was one that implicitly responded to a criticism of John in Ad conditorem, was that friars were completely forbidden to exchange even small items like books outside the order 'since this can in no way be done without special licence of the lord Pope, to whom belongs the lordship of the aforesaid things.'
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Of course, ever since the papal retentio dominii of the goods Franciscans use came into effect, which was only made explicit in 1245 by Innocent IV, only those goods over which the donors refused to continue to exercise proprietary rights came under the right, ownership, and lordship of the Church. 94 Thus, in theory, many things remained outside of the direct control of the Church, before and after the change in policy pronounced in Ad conditorem. Thus, the constitutions continue on rather blithely with yet another addition that is ambiguously in tune with papal policy, both pre-and post-Ad conditorem:
Also, the other things, the dominium of which the lord Pope does not retain, which will come to the brothers in the future, the brothers may not sell (or divide up for sale) in the other ways mentioned above without the express licence of the donors in whose power the dominium is reserved. 95 The text is phrased in such a way that one might understand the point to be that since the all lordship must henceforth remain with the donors. The Constitutions of Lyons, which postdate Ad conditorem, Cum inter, and Quia quorundam mentes, allowed any Franciscan who was concerned about the rejection of papal overlordship of the things the friars used to believe that the donors (now) always retained lordship. Perhaps that was the goal. In general, however, the Constitutions solve the problem by avoiding these recent bulls and referring to the provisions of Exiit instead. 97 pope john xxii on ius and usus Anyone familiar with the poverty controversy is well aware of the important role Pope John XXII played. 98 Although this is not the time to reconsider the nature of his contributions to the extent that they deserve, it is important nonetheless to examine, albeit briefly, some of the technical concepts he brought to bear in his bulls dealing with Franciscan poverty.
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The pope's ideas about use first manifest in the earlier version of the bull Ad conditorem (8 December 1322), but are given an extensive reworking in the second version, which was published in the wake of Bonagratia's appeal from the following month (itself replete with citations of canon and Roman law). 100 The leadership of the Franciscan order had been content to argue that an important component of religious poverty was the inward disposition a friar had when making use of things he did not own. John agreed; but he was convinced that the expropriation Franciscans enjoyed through the papal overlordship of the goods which they used had not made the friars any less preoccupied with temporal things. If anything, it had made things rather worse. 101 John noted that there were many practical problems regarding the existing arrangement for Franciscan poverty, but he also noted a serious theoretical objection: it was not Franciscan use which was 'bare' (nudus), but the Church's lordship of what the Franciscans used.
While Franciscans were accustomed to speak of their 'simple' use of fact ever since the publication of Exiit, 102 John opted for bare use of fact (nudum usum facti).
103 It is not clear why he chose to do so, but it is possible that the term suggested itself to him from his familiarity with Roman law discussions of use, which do speak of 'bare use' in a number of places. The pope argued that one could not be a 'bare user' (nudus usuarius) if the person is allowed to exchange, sell, or give away the item in question. These were activities more normally associated with lords than bare users. 104 In the revised version of Ad conditorem, the picture : 'Quis enim nudum usuarium poterit dicere cui rem usuariam licet permutare, vendere ac donare? Procul dubio haec naturam usus noscuntur excedere, nec ad usuarium sed ad dominum potius pertinere. Haec evidenter arguunt talem usuarium minime fore nudum, quae quidem de rebus nonnullis mobilibus fratres ipsi faciunt, adserentes sibi per ordinationem huiusmodi hoc concessum. ' becomes clearer. Although the pope now spoke of simple use of fact, he explicitly connected his discussion of use to the Romanist concepts of servitudes.
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There are two passages, which may seem to be somewhat at odds with one another. They read as follows:
For, since usufruct, just as it is established as a ius in re, which is called a personal servitude, and for which there belong real actions, is nothing other than a right of using and enjoying, so is use, which is a personal servitude, nothing other than only a right of using someone else's things with the substance preserved; that is, a right of receiving the fruits and other utility, in whole or in part in his own name, which can come from the thing in which the usufruct or use is established. 106 Besides, nor can a personal right of using-one which is neither a ius in re nor a personal servitude, but is a purely personal right for which there do not belong real actions-be established or had in such things or for such things [sc. consumables], since such a right also demands that some utility can come in such a way from the thing which is conceded to the user, and to remain with the use of the user, with the substance of the thing preserved: which, just as it can be perceived by the senses, can by no means be found in things consumable by use. 107 These two passages are very compressed accounts of usus and ius utendi. John first points out that use, like usufruct, is a type of personal servitude. Use, as one commentator put it, 'is a fraction of usufruct': it allowed the beneficiary to use a thing, but not enjoy its fruits.
108 Use, as it is meant in this context, does not allow for an impairment of the substance, 109 but any profit or utility deriving from the use could be enjoyed. Such a personal servitude, as both use and usufruct are, are said 105. Cf. the claim at QVR, 576, that Ad conditorem speaks in the same way as Exiit, and the iura do. 106. ACC 2 105-111 (237-38): 'Cum enim usufructus prout est ius in re constitutus, qui seruitus dicitur personalis et pro quo reales competunt acciones, nichil sit aliud quam ius utendi fruendi, nec usus, qui eciam personalis est seruitus, sit aliud quam ius tantum utendi rebus alienis substancia salua rei, id est, ius percipiendi fructus et utilitatem aliam in totum uel pro parte suo nomine qui possunt ex re in qua usufructus seu usus constituitur prouenire. ' 107. ACC 2 120-126 (239): 'Adhuc nec ius utendi, quod nec est ius in re, nec seruitus personalis, sed mere ius personale, pro quo reales acciones non competunt, in rebus talibus uel rebus ipsis utendi potest constitui uel haberi, cum et ius tale exigat quod ex re ipsa quae ad utendum conceditur tali modo ad usuarium peruenire posset utilitas aliqua ac cum usu permanere usuarii substancia salua rei, quod nequaquam potest sicut ad sensum potest percipi in rebus usu consumptibilibus reperiri. ' Cf. QVR, 575. 108. Nicholas, Introduction 144. 109. John argued that abusus better served the purpose of describing the 'use' of consumables, whose substance was necessarily lost in the process of being used. See ACC 2 99-105 (237), 144-156 (240-41); QVR, 576-78, bases its arguments on specific references to Justinian's Digest. For Pope John XXII and the Michaelists on the problem of consumables, see R. Lambertini, 'Usus and usura: Poverty and Usury in the Franciscans' Responses to John XXII's Quia vir reprobus', Franciscan Studies 54 (1994-1997) 185-210, which can be found in revised form in Id., La povertà pensata 227-47. 23* to be iura in re (aliena), or rights over another person's property. One reason why they are said to be 'in re' is because, as Jesselin's Apparatus explains, they require a 'fixed body, ' which, if removed, means a loss of the usufruct (or use) as well. 110 As personal servitudes, which are so called because they inhere in the person rather than the thing (as do praedial servitudes), and which are inalienable, 111 the beneficiary also has a remedy if his use (or enjoyment) is obstructed; he has, that is, a 'real action. ' 112 Real actions are claims in rem; that is, one is asserting a claim upon some thing, not upon another person (actio personalis). As John said of usus, one has a right to use a thing. But, and this is the point of the second quotation, the ius utendi he was speaking about was not one which could be classed as a personal servitude but merely a personal right. Another ius utendi might be counted as a personal servitude, but not so for consumables. If the Latin of Ad conditorem was ambiguous on this point, Quia vir is clear:
But it is agreed that, according to the laws, neither [1] ususfruct nor [2] a right of using that is a servitude, nor [3] even a right of using that is not a servitude but a purely personal right, can be established or had in things consumable by use, as it is proved in Dig. 7.5.1 and 2, Dig. 12.2.11.2, Dig. 13.6.3.6, with many similar passages. 113 It is well known that the pope's ultimate goal in passages like these was to argue that proper "use" of consumables requires ownership, but he was also making a deeper point at the same time. The issue turns on what he meant by ius personale . . . utendi.
114 Michael took it as a synonym for 'one's own right, ' (ius proprium), 115 but he probably meant this right of using was what we might term a ius in personam, where the legal bond exists between two people: one person is owed something by another. 116 Thus if a right of using, which is personal, is in personam, what is owed by the owner to the right-holder is the use. The point of this distinction is that, unlike a ius in rem, the claim afforded by such a personal right is only available against the owner, not obstructing third parties. 117 In other words, contrary to a prevalent Franciscan claim, it is evident that there can be no simple equation of ius utendi and ius agendi: friars do not obtain a generic right to take legal action simply by virtue of being granted a ius utendi whenever, as John claimed, something is given for them to use. This, too, should be expected of a jurist steeped in ideas of the ius commune. As he baldly stated later on in Quia vir, one might have a right of using and yet not have any right to take legal action. 118 Modern legal systems are usually framed in terms of rights, but this is not true of classical law, which phrased things in terms of actions. So far, there seems to be little difference between having a right and an action since the actio is a means of pursuing one's right, but this is not how classical jurists thought. Instead of rights, they thought of remedies, and instead of causes for action, they thought of forms of action. For Romans, and seemingly for John XXII as well, the idea was that one could pursue his claim in court only if he could express it in an appropriate formula. 119 This, then, helps us understand the pope's point that civil laws (iura ciuiles) introduced the way of taking action for temporal things, and that this is the point of D. 8 c. 1: ius ciuile brought in the formulas of action. 120 As a right of using was only held against the owner, it was entirely possible for one to have such a ius and yet lack the appropriate actio.
The foregoing by no means exhausts the pope's account of property rights in this bull, 121 but it does highlight the technical nature of his thought, which, if more often asserted than analyzed in current scholarship, was by no means lost on the Michaelists. Francis and William, theologians to the end, disliked the overly narrow (they thought) legal perspective of John's bulls. 122 Michael and Bonagratia expressed similar views, but one suspects that Bonagratia at least understood the deeper implications of what the pope was arguing, even if they, too, avoided getting too deeply embroiled in a discussion of servitudes and the differences between rights in rem and in personam. 123 That is, they did not in fact fight 'on the pope's own ground, ' as it is sometimes claimed (disparagingly) of Ockham; 124 rather, in their view it was the pope's position that was too parochial.
the michaelists on property
So how does this all compare with the views of the leading Michaelists? 126 Although there are points of similarity with what we have seen so far, the picture has certainly become far more elaborate. Given the length of the texts involved, it is impossible to provide a full answer. The focus in what follows will be to look at the writings of Bonagratia and Michael, although Francis and William will also be invoked where it seems useful.
Let us start with the acquisition of proprietary lordship. 127 The first thing to note is that the debate has matured enough that a defence of Franciscan poverty required a fresh examination of the origins of property. 128 The second point to note is that the acquisition of lordship takes place in the context of human dominium, not divine, which is itself grounded in human positive law (ius) rather than divine or natural law. 129 The original acquisition of lordship occurred early on in the postlapsarian world 'through a division of souls, ' 130 or, according to a gloss to the Decretum, 'through iniquity, ' which, Michael explained, meant through an anxious preoccupation (sollicitudo) for temporal things. 131 In other words, property is acquired only where there is the will to acquire it:
No one can regularly acquire ownership, lordship, nay, not even possession over things (consumable or not) unless he has the will or spirit of acquiring or having. 132 Yet merely willing to acquire lordship or lesser property rights is not always enough. One must also not be subject to another person in the way that a slave is to a master; that is, one must be sui iuris or in sua potestate.
133 Furthermore, actual possession or occupancy of a thing usually must also be acquired in the case of movables. For instance, one might need to buy or be given lordship of the thing in question. Francis and Ockham would also point out that some dominia had been divinely instituted, although this seems to have occurred only in the past.
134
If the account of how one acquires lordship seems straightforward, the range of powers associated with the possession of lordship is more complicated. One reason for this is that the Michaelists described two forms of lordship, a 'full' version, which most laymen are able to have, and a 'restricted' version, which is appropriate to prelates of the Church. Bonagratia and Michael often used terms like quasi dominium, quasi proprietas, and even, referring to Innocent IV and Hostiensis, dominium utile.
135
Regular lordship comprises three basic powers, which I shall again designate as actio in iudicio, administratio, and usus (see Fig. 2 This was essentially the same point that the pope had made about a personal right of using, but what he did not add is that the actio was no good against interfering third parties. Ockham thought this the most common meaning of dominium: 'a principal human power of claiming and defending a temporal thing in court, ' but he was probably unaware of its restricted scope in cases where less than dominium was at issue. 138 As an exceptio was a legal defence which rendered the plaintiff's claim invalid, 139 and an actio was essentially nothing 'other than the right to go to court to get what one is owed, ' the precise terminology, the point was that lordship ensured one could take action in court to protect his interests. These legal powers are also characteristic of restricted lordship, as are some of the ones that fall under the second major category (administratio), which covers what we might call the powers to dispose and manage the thing. There is a difference between full and restricted lordship here. Full, or regular, lordship allows for a great deal of latitude. As Ockham explained, the dominus can treat his possession in any way not forbidden by natural law. 141 One can sell, transfer, bequeath, alienate, transfer or give away what one owns, and can do so with various conditions attached. Notice that Ockham has named actions which involve divesting oneself of the lordship. It is important to the Franciscans that this is not the only thing one can do. One can also permit someone a licence to use the item (licentia utendi) while retaining lordship of the item.
142
It is different with restricted lordship. The difference is that one cannot do what one wishes with the goods over which restricted lordship is exercised: one may not act ad libitum. Thus, while someone who had restricted lordship could sell or transfer an item, this could only be done for the sustenance of one or another of the members of the community (i.e., congregatio fidelium).
143 This type of ownership gives the owner the power to claim the thing in court, but does not include the power of freely managing, selling, giving, bequeathing, alienating, or using the thing. 144 It is for this reason that Bonagratia referred to them as dispensatores et amministratores pauperum, for they only 'have' things in this sense.
145
One final point is particularly important to the Franciscan point of view. This restricted form of lordship still possesses enough of the incidents of lordship for us to consider the papal retentio dominii a valid form of lordship.
146 Ecclesiastical lordship is, in all cases, limited in comparison with regular, lay, lordship. But the characteristic that remains unaltered in both forms is the ability to litigate for it in court. Ockham's insistence on one being able to defend the things one owns in court as the principal feature of lordship takes on new importance when considered in connection with the things Franciscans use but do not own. The third major category must be use, for anyone with dominium clearly has the power, or right, to use the thing. Figure 3 represents the breakdown of usus (considered absolutely, or independently from the use a lord has) as it can be determined from Michael's appeals. 147 Under the title of dominium, one also has, in the Michaelist view, a use of right or right of using (the Michaelists were not always clear about the distinction), which was very different from simple use of fact. To say that a dominus has a right of using or use of fact is evidently different from the technical, legal meaning of ius utendi, which as the Michaelists point out, referred only to using goods that one did not own. 148 Possession of dominium entitles one to use, deteriorate or impair, and consume a thing. One who possesses only the right of using, however, is subject to certain restrictions. While consumption is the natural and expected result of using res usu consumptibiles, the same is not true of more permanent objects. One gets the sense that holders of a ius utendi may not misuse the things they have a right to use. In Roman law using a thing in a way other than how it had been agreed was known as a 'theft of the use' (furtum usus), 149 but this term does not make an appearance in the Michaelists texts-perhaps because they had already insisted that, contrary to what the pope thought, abusus referred to the misuse of things.
In these debates, use was never limited to a power claimed only by owners. A right of use could also be a self-standing type of lesser property right. The challenge John XXII posed was whether it was possible to use things licitly and justly without having at least such a ius utendi. 150 Although the Michaelists were united in the belief that one could so use things, even consumables, without such a right, each Michaelist provided a slightly different answer as to why the right was unnecessary. 151 From the point of continuity with the previous decade, the texts of Bonagratia and Michael are the most interesting. Michael relied on the jurist Azo to separate the act of using from the pope's right of using: although use which is a right or servitude cannot exist in consumables, 'use which is a deed (factum), or consists in the deed (in facto), such as drinking and eating, can well exist.' 152 In the later appeal, he explained that the pope was in fact referring to a 'use of civil right' rather than the universal definition of the term, 153 and that this use of right, as the pope even said, was a right for using someone else's things. 154 Michael envisaged three different uses of right: civil, natural, and divine. The use of civil right could be further subdivided into more and less universal types. 155 Elsewhere, the use of right was described as an 'exclusive right of using' (ius proprium utendi), 156 the possession of which inherently includes an actio in court.
(factual) user. 165 Michael read a gloss about peculium (which I have been unable to trace), which apparently connects the situation of a secular lord's servants and that of a religious: both use by licence, but without any right of using. (He connected the alleged gloss [ad Dig. 15.1.25] to a passage of the Decretum [C. 19 q. 3 c. 9]). 166 Another example also came from the Decretum, where he read that passing through another's field is fas, not ius, and then argued that divine ius allowed an action that civil ius might prohibit. 167 Taken together, Michael thought these formed the legal background of what goes on when a rich host invites a man to eat at his table. In this scenario all that is given is a licence to 'use' the food in a specific way; that is, the guests cannot use the food to start a food fight, or sell it later on-unless that is how the host wants the guests to use the food. 168 Use by licence is licit and just, but only so long as the licence endures; if the owner revokes the licence, the use must stop, and there can be no appeal to the courts for the use. conclusion On the whole, the way Franciscan poverty was described underwent some significant changes. There were similarities, certainly, but the differences are more striking. The similarities are what one would expect, deriving entirely from the position established in Exiit qui seminat: Franciscans possess nothing but a simple use of fact, with all other rights vested in some other body, be it the Church or the original donors. In other words, that a separation of use and all types of property rights was possible. The most notable argument that the leaders of the order made during the pontificate of Clement V was that it was entirely possible for a Franciscan to happen to control access to the things they certainly did not own without thereby having any sort of proprietary interest or stake in the things. This, as we have seen, was achieved by an argument for the primacy of intention in determining whether one stood in a proprietary relationship with the goods in question.
The emphasis on intentionality was not to last. Ubertino ridiculed the idea when he criticized contemporary practice, 169 and Pope John XXII ended up adopting a similar line or argumentation when he came to explain the nature of religious poverty. 170 The Michaelists, unsurprisingly, downplayed the importance of one's interior disposition in their account of poverty. Bonagratia's treatise on the poverty of Christ and the apostles, which was written before John's bulls, represents a sort of middle ground, where the internal disposition still plays a pivotal role. 171 Among the later texts, Francis put it best when he insisted that just as virtue must 'burst forth' (prorumpat) into real activity at times, so too must evangelical poverty must shine forth in an exterior expression (habitu exteriori) in proportion to the interior disposition (habitus interioris).
172 Needless to say, all discussion of Franciscans carrying about the keys to strong-boxes was quietly left unsaid.
With the exception of accessus and usus, the list of powers associated with property ownership remained mostly the same. But use presented its own special problems for Franciscans. Prior to Ad conditorem, most discussions about use were more practical than theoretical. The issue then was what degree of use was appropriate to a person who had no rights to the use; the pope took the debate to a more fundamental level: was any use possible without any rights? to Olivi on this point. Grossi's analysis of Ubertino, while still overly metaphysical, is more persuasive (346-48). 172. Improbatio 436 (228). Reducendo 76-84 (46), makes a similar point, but reverses it: the internal There was no short answer from the Michaelist camp, but they did all answer 'yes' based on similar but still unique analyses of usus into two constituent parts: the act of using and the legal use (ius utendi, and usus iuris). Michael's appeals rose to the challenge posed by the pope's discussion of servitudes. I have highlighted some of the legal arguments made in Michael's appeals, and I do not mean to suggest that that is all there is to them, but there is no denying that his analysis of use and the possibility of using without any positive law derived rights is heavily indebted to Roman ideas about ownership and use. As I have tried to show elsewhere, Ockham's account of use eschewed Roman law for the most part in favour of canon law, and Francis relied entirely on philosophical and theological arguments, and where even the briefest citations of the Institutes were prone to errors one might expect of one who had only heard them second-hand.
173
For Michael, the foundation of any licit, but extra-legal, act of using was comprised of two parts: the faculty and the licence. Human beings have, de iure naturali, a faculty to use, and in a world free of property rights, one may thereby use things licitly and without acquiring any rights or property from such an act. (The diminished role of intentionality remains important here.) Yet fourteenthcentury Europe, especially in the cities where the friars lived and worked, was not such a world. The business of poverty, as one chronicler once wrote, 174 required negotiation in a world where there were few res nullius. This is why the licence to use was so important. It made a friar's use licit, assuming all the other conditions were met: that the item was not prohibited; it was not being mis-used (abusus); that the use only took place while the licensor wanted; and that the friar did not have the wrong intentions regarding his use. The other important feature of the licence was that, according to the Michaelists, an arbitrary revocation of the licence, even one sine causa, could take place at any time, and there was nothing a friar could do about it since a licence was not a ius. (The inviolability of one's ius without cause would form one of the most important features of Ockham's mature political thought.) Yet there is, by way of conclusion, something of a disconnect here, for it is well known that Franciscans did litigate for many things, albeit not in the name of their order but of the Church instead. This was one of the problems Pope John XXII and Ubertino da Casale (to name only two critics) had with the existing arrangement of Franciscan poverty. 175 An interesting essay remains to be written regarding Michaelist views about litigation and the Franciscan presence in various courts. 
